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The gap between the Cold War’s history and its new historiography spanned only about
a decade and a half. The Cold War concluded during the George H.W. Bush presidency,
but for the  eld we now call “the US and the world,” the Cold War paradigm reached its
terminus, if we have to be speci c, in 2005. That year saw the publication of two books
that together marked a milestone in how scholars would write about the Cold War. John
Lewis Gaddis’ The Cold War: A New History told its story through engaging prose and a
top-down approach that gave pride of place to Washington and Moscow as the centers
of a bifurcated world. For its part, Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War: Third World
Interventions and the Making of Our Times offered a triangular model in which empires
of liberty and of justice interacted with Third World revolutionaries who led campaigns
for decolonization that shifted into high gear after World War II. Gaddis’ survey
represented a culmination of the traditional two-camps schema which tended to re ect
self-understandings of the US government but which, after Westad’s concurrent
synthesis, could no longer stand without quali cation, without reference to the colonial
dimension of the Cold War itself. In this sense, 2005 was a before-and-after
historiographical event.
The classic Cold War concept, in which the governing and formal decolonization of
Western Europe’s empires was one thing, and the rivalry between the superpowers
something altogether else, has become diminished, but not because of one book alone.
Various social movements have rejected the tenets of the Cold War at different times,
and as far back as 1972, historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko argued that “The so-called
Cold War…was far less the confrontation of the United States with Russia than America’s
expansion into the entire world.”[2] In 2000, Matthew Connelly called attention to the
distortions accompanying attempts to have postwar history  tted to the constraints of
the Cold War paradigm. The “Cold War lens,” as Connelly memorably called it, had
obscured racial and religious realities. As more scholars began to push the weight of
culture, decolonization, gender, public opinion, and more against the Cold War
paradigm’s once stable conceptual walls, the foundations faltered. And since Westad’s
2005 landmark, a notable tendency has developed across the disciplines in which
scholars – notably Mark Philip Bradley, Jodi Kim, Heonik Kwon, and the authors
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(including Westad) contributing to Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell’s volume on the Cold War
idea – have further troubled the notion that what followed World War II is best
understood by focusing on how the leaders of the US and USSR saw the world.[3]
It’s also worth noting that the recent literature’s rough division between works that sit
more comfortably within the Cold War paradigm and those that prompt a rethinking of
its foundations does not map neatly
onto the difference between local
and globally-oriented studies.
Melvin Le er’s 2008 transnational
history of US-Soviet relations and
Samuel Zipp’s New-York focused
book on urban renewal of 2010 both
 t within Cold War studies, for
example, while Masuda Hajimu’s
global reinterpretation of the Korean
War and Yulia Komska’s cultural
genealogy of the West German-
Czech borderlands (both published
in 2015) render suspect what we
thought we knew about the Cold
War.[4] All four books are excellent,
and it would be unhelpful to make a
“without paradigm good, within
paradigm bad” argument across
wide swaths of insightful
scholarship. The point is, rather, to
note that The Cold War: A World
History arrives at what Federico Romero calls a historiographical crossroads, on a
conceptual terrain conspicuously remapped since the publication of The Global Cold
War.
As astute reviewers of this new book have already noted, there’s much to admire in
Westad’s World History. It’s di cult to think of a more capable and knowledgeable guide
to this nearly-overwhelming topic than its author, and the book’s promise is delivered in
full. Organization must have been a challenge for a book that knows so much, but the
chapter headings strike just the right balance between telegraphing what’s coming and
revealing the not-completely-expected around various corners, as when an analysis of
mid-sixties coups in Congo and Indonesia shows up amid a discussion of the US war
against Vietnam, or Tito’s Yugoslavia appears amid Nehru’s India, or Bandung amid
Suez. Then there’s the sources. The library of secondary sources that A World
History must certainly have been based on remains offstage, beyond covers of the book,
meaning that readers are presented with a curated set – the  nal authority within which,
as readers will  nd on page 675, provides a synth-pop surprise – of footnoted primary
sources to consult and consider. Within the body of the text, these sources leave a trail
of anecdotes at turns entertaining and instructive, and as readers of Westad’s history of
China and the world might expect, he shares a small sampling of personal
reminiscences along the way that only add to the narrative.
Crucially for a work that seeks to take a complex subject off campus, A World
History features a steady stream of interpretive insights and lively, often economical,
prose. Among the insights, the account of the Cold War’s end as the decomposition of a
diplomatic structure rather than an all-of-a-sudden event marks a particular advance in
our understanding, and should hopefully put to rest simplistic theories of Ronald
Reagan’s single-handed victory over the USSR. The  nal chapters show how shifts in the
global economy, in technology, in environmental awareness, in ideas about identity, and
in the ascendancy of rights discourses, all of which have roots traceable to at least the
1970s, wound down the superpower contest more than any presidential policy. In terms
of writing, between European and US teenagers “more united by Brando than NATO” in
the 1950s, Indian Five Year Plans that were “more Lenin than Laski,” and a state of
affairs originating in the 1980s in which “neoconservative politics upheld neoliberal
economics, and vice versa,” World History’s style is another of its strengths. This is all
the more so because Westad not only explains various episodes clearly but also
maintains a brisk pacing that never lingers too long on a given topic. No one could
possibly read this book and not learn something, probably many things, new. Did you
know that Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella was overthrown in 1965 by forces who
posed as extras during the  lming of Gillo Pontecorvo’s Battle of Algiers?
If the main distinction between Westad’s Global and World histories is that between
scholarly breakthrough and wide-audience overview, both books should be counted as
equally successful. But both also exist in relation to academic literatures, and their
relationship to imperial history constitutes a notable difference between the two
volumes. The Global Cold War kicked open the doorway between an older binary model
and one in which “the Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through slightly
different means.” A World History takes a more ambiguous stance toward the question
of empire. Even the table of contents suggests the change: in the earlier book,
anticolonialists of the global South are the subject of the third chapter, the  rst two
dedicated respectively to the empires of the US and USSR. In the new book, global
decolonization does not come fully into focus until chapter 10.
This is not to say that imperial history is
relegated to the side lines of Westad’s
new Cold War story. In the introduction,
we are told – in an echo from The
Global Cold War – that both the
communist and capitalist conceptions
of modernity grew out of European
expansion. A World History also points
out that for “Third World leaders the
Cold War was an outgrowth of the
colonial system,” and that from this
perspective, the “Cold War was against
the interests of the Third World.”
Speaking more directly in his own voice,
Westad opens a chapter on the Middle
East with the following sentence: “As
everywhere else in Asia and Africa, the
Cold War in the Middle East must be
understood as part of a long-term
struggle between colonialism and its
opponents.” The Cold War, then, was colonialism. But in multiple other places in the
book, the Cold War is presented as something other than imperial. “Postwar US
Administrations,” for instance, “mostly failed to prioritize anticolonialism over Cold War
concerns.” In Algeria, “the Cold War priorities of the United States had little time for
France’s last colonial war,” while in Vietnam, the postwar con ict “started as a revolt
against colonial oppression and ended as a set of wars deeply enmeshed with the
global Cold War.” The Cold War, here, was distinct from colonialism. If The Global Cold
War marked an imperial turn within Cold War studies, A World History seems to take a
step back. Just when Cold War studies appears poised to productively merge into the
fold of imperial studies, Westad’s authoritative new synthesis stops short of telling the
story of the Cold War as one of colonialism’s chapters.
And it is in this very tension between the Cold War and the imperial, one left unresolved
in this new and very worthwhile book, that speaks most directly to what remains at
stake in the study of the Cold War. For Cold War studies, World History indicates that the
 eld is in a period of  ux, its future uncertain. Whether the study of the Cold War will be
reinvigorated by a greater engagement with colonial studies or instead become
overwhelmed by it remains to be seen. Meanwhile, Cold War and colonial themes, as
everyone knows, animate contemporary political debate. In uential arguments hailing
from within the classic paradigm assume the Cold War while redeploying its ideological
tools in service of the political status quo. A World History gives such arguments
precious little oxygen, but as more writers present the Cold War as colonial history, the
tenets of old style anticommunism will seem all the less tenable.
A World History takes us some of the way toward a deeper interaction between Cold
War and colonial studies, but there is farther to go and more to be gained by venturing a
greater distance in this direction. For example, bringing these  elds into greater
conversation could further enhance insights about race, gender, and culture that have
already done so much to transform the study of the Cold War. It could also help make
sense of US politics that connect to larger continuities but seem since 2016 to have
cast aside assumptions subscribed to by both main parties since the late-1940s. It
could potentially bring greater comparative clarity to the public discussion
about whether rigor or apologia is the better way to approach the topic of imperialism.
It could further enliven analyses of the Cold War with revelatory
retheorizations and promising lines of historical inquiry from new perspectives
on decolonization, non-alignment, and the Fourth World. It could make more apparent
how the colonial policies of incarceration grew out of Cold War narratives of security
and the criminalization of dissent. It could more fully demonstrate, as Timothy Nunan
puts it, how “Cold War entanglements re ected bigger debates abut Third World
sovereignty.”
Such an interaction could see Cold War studies become a sub eld of colonial studies.
[6] And why not? “It is quite possible,” World History’s introduction notes, “that the Cold
War will be reduced in signi cance by future historians.” That process, one which
Westad himself has played a decisive role in propelling, is already discernible in the
historiography, especially in relation to the history of imperialism. But before saying
good bye to all that has comprised the Cold War paradigm, we needed a full account, a
last word, that summed it all up, something like what John Lewis Gaddis did in
2005. World History has given us that. So let’s read it and learn from it as we witness the
event that is a shift between paradigms.
[1] Thank you to Radhika Natarajan and Padraig Riley for sharing their very invaluable
insights with me on the relationships between empire and the Cold War.
[2] Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power, The World and United States Foreign
Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 31.
[3] Mark Philip Bradley, “Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919-1962,”
in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I: Origins, Eds. Melvyn P. Le er and
Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 464-485; Jodi
Kim, Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2010); Heonik Kwon, The Other Cold War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010); Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, Eds., Uncertain Empire: American
History and the Idea of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Although its argument is not explicitly concerned with reframing the Cold War idea, Vijay
Prashad’s essential The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York:
New Press, 2007) demonstrates how decolonization in the twentieth century can be
narrated without reliance upon a Cold War framing.
[4] Melvyn P. Le er, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and
the Cold War (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2007); Samuel Zipp, Manhattan
Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010); Masuda Hajimu, Cold War Crucible: The Korean Con ict and the
Postwar World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Yulia Komska, The
Icon Curtain: The Cold War’s Quiet Border (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
[5] For the Soviet side, see, for example, the argument that “Stalin’s design for ‘socialism
in one country’ became in reality colonialism in one country” in Kate Brown’s brilliant A
Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2003), 115, and a discussion of some of the more recent literature in
Moritz Florin, “Beyond Colonialism? Agency, Power, and the Making of Soviet Central
Asia,” Kritika 18, no. 4 (Fall 2017): 872-838. For US empire, the starting point remains
Paul A. Kramer’s superb summation of the literature, from which I borrow some of my
title here: “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States and the
World,” American Historical Review 116, no. 5 (December 2011): 1348-1391.
[6] Though not a work about the Cold War per se, the ways that the Cold War as a
subject is folded into a larger history of US empire in the essays of Nikhil Singh’s Race
and America’s Long War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017) make that book
an exemplary model of the kind of approach I’m thinking of here.
You may also like:
Undergraduate Essay Contest Honorable Mention: The Global Cold War by Odd Arne
Westad (2007) 
Ideological Origins of a Cold Warrior: John Foster Dulles and his Grandfather 
THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN




More from Digital History
FILMS & MEDIA
Cold War Crucible: The Korean Con ict and the Postwar World, by Hajimu Masuda
(2015)
Posted February 19, 2018
More 1900s, Books, Cold War, Empire, Transnational
Making History: Houston’s “Spirit of the Confederacy”
May 06, 2020
America for Americans: A History of Xenophobia in the United
States by Erika Lee (2019)
April 20, 2020
Ticha: Digital Archive Review
May 27, 2020
Jojo Rabbit (Dir: Taika Waititi, 2019)
More from Films & Media
TEXAS
More from Texas
19th century 20th Century African American History american history Asia Asia & Middle East book review Brazil
British Empire China Civil War Cold War Colonialism communism cultural history digital history Early Modern Europe 
Europe  lm gender history History of Science immigration India Islam Latin America Latin American History 
Mexico Not Even Past Public History race religion Russia slavery Texas Texas History Texas History Day 
Transnational Twentieth Century History United States US History USSR Womens History world history 
World War II
NOT EVEN PAST is produced by 
The Department of History 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN  




All content © 2010-present NOT EVEN PAST and the authors, unless otherwise noted
Sign up to receive bi-weekly email updates
SUBSCRIBE
June 08, 2020
Spanish Flu in the Texas Oil Fields
May 26, 2020
Your email address
BOOKS FILMS & MEDIA THE PUBLIC
HISTORIAN
BLOG TEXAS
